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Abstract In this paper I discuss a popular position in the climate justice literature
concerning historical accountability for climate change. According to this view,
historical high-emitters of greenhouse gases—or currently existing individuals that
are appropriately related to them—are in possession of some form of emission debt,
owed to certain of those who are now burdened by climate change. It is frequently
claimed that such debts were originally incurred by historical emissions that vio-
lated a principle of fair shares for the world’s natural resources. Thus, a suit-
able principle of natural resource justice is required to render this interpretation of
historical accountability complete. I argue that the need for such a principle poses a
significant challenge for the historical emission debt view, because there doesn’t
appear to be any determinate answer to the question what a fair share of climate sink
capacity would have been historically. This leaves the historical emission debt view
incomplete and thus unable to explain a powerful intuition that appears to motivate
the view: namely, that there is something unjust about how the climate sink has
historically been used. I suggest an alternative explanation of this common intuition
according to which historically unequal consumption of climate sink capacity,
whether or not wrongful in and of itself, is a symptom of broader global injustice
concerning control over and access to the world’s natural resources. This broader
historical injustice will be harder to quantify and harder to repair than that which the
historical emission debt purports to identify.
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Historical Accountability for Climate Change: The Emission Debt
Approach
Discussions of historical accountability for climate change are often couched in the
terminology of debt: whether carbon debt, atmospheric debt, emission debt, climate
debt, ecological debt, or natural debt. These concepts have entered the international
climate debate due to the efforts of indigenous peoples, state representatives,
campaigners and NGOs, and the media1; and are drawing the attention of an
increasing number of theorists concerned with the normative dimensions of climate
change.2 Accounts of how such debts are incurred and what they amount to vary.
Some employ the notion to express the simple and plausible claim that the wealthy
and industrialised have a moral duty to assist those particularly vulnerable to
climate change grounded not in beneficence or charity, but by the fact that they are
the most significant contributors to/beneficiaries of the process that created this
problem. Others draw on tools from environmental economics in an attempt to
provide a precise calculation of such debts.3
In this paper I follow Jonathan Pickering and Christian Barry by looking at a set
of views according to which debts are possessed by those who ‘have used more than
their fair share of the Earth’s ability to absorb the GHG emissions that cause climate
change’ (Pickering and Barry 2012, p. 670). What I term ‘the historical emission
debt view’ (HED) takes debts to have been incurred by those who historically used
more than their fair share of the assimilative capacity of the global climate sink (the
natural resource composed of forests, soils, the atmosphere and the ocean that
assimilates our GHG emissions). The rough idea behind HED is that one can use a
principle specifying just limits on historical use of climate sink capacity to identify
debtors and creditors as—in the first instance—those who historically consumed
more than their fair share of climate sink capacity and those at whose expense this
excess use took place, respectively. As with financial debts, one might then argue
that historical emission debts can be passed on to third parties in certain ways
(usually through the transfer of goods to which those debts are attached); or, where
these debts are incurred by collective entities such as companies and states, they
may be claimed to persist through time despite changes in the membership of those
entities.
1 See, for example: the Anchorage Declaration (2009), the People’s Agreement of Cochabamba (2010);
statements by the G77 and Bolivia (G77 2000: Art.45), Navarro (2009); the joint report by the World
Development Movement and Jubilee Debt Campaign (Jones and Edwards 2009) and Klein’s (2009)
Rolling Stone article.
2 See Agarwal (2002, p. 377), Athanasiou and Baer (2002, p. 82), Baer (2002, p. 402), Beckerman and
Pasek (1995, p. 410), Caney (2006, p. 464), Cripps (2011, p. 126), Duus-Otterstro¨m (2014), Eckersley
(2015, pp. 486–487), Goeminne and Paredis (2010, §5), Grubb et al. (1992, p. 312), Halme (2007),
Hayward (2007, p. 445), Kartha (2011, pp. 508–509), Knight (2011, p. 535), Martinez-Alier and Naron
(2004, p. 18), Miller (2008, p. 133), Sinden (2010) and Smith (1991). Some theorists equate such debt
with the idea of historical responsibility (Athanasiou and Baer 2002, p. 121) or historical accountability
(Neumayer 2000, p. 186; Risse 2012, p. 394, fn.16).
3 See Matthews (2015), Neumayer (2000).
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HED can be more precisely characterised as follows4: (1) historical emission
debts are incurred by historical use of climate sink capacity in violation of a
principle of fair shares (I explain what I mean by ‘historical use’ below); (2) the
debtors are individuals or collectives that either (a) historically used more than a fair
share themselves (historical polluters), or (b) are related to historical polluters in an
appropriate way; and (3) the creditors are individuals or collectives on whom the
impacts of climate change impose costs (either adaptation costs, or costs associated
with loss and damage).5 I leave the question of what is owed by the debtors to the
creditors open, but note that part of the appeal of HED appears to be that historical
emissions can be relatively easily quantified and then converted into financial
obligations.6
By historical use of climate sink capacity I mean something quite specific. In
particular, I single out use by those who satisfy two criteria: firstly, they are no
longer alive; and secondly, they could not have been expected to know that they
were contributing to climate change. This restriction is designed to simplify the
discussion that follows by ruling out certain other—very important—grounds on
which responsibility for bearing the costs of climate change might be allocated. It is
plausible that many currently existing people possess certain such responsibilities as
a result of their past emissions of GHGs, regardless of whether they knew that they
were contributing to climate change at the time. And I think—though I will not
defend this position here—that individuals, collectives and corporations that have
avoidably (in some sense to be specified) continued to exploit fossil fuels and emit
GHGs when they knew, or should (in some sense to be specified) have known, that
they were contributing to climate change are both morally culpable and significantly
accountable for dealing with the problem. The same holds for those who have
sought to prevent restrictions being placed on GHG emissions by undermining
political negotiations and environmental policymaking, and spreading misinforma-
tion about climate change. My focus in this piece, however, is purely on the
question of whether accountability can also accrue on other grounds than this: and in
particular, as a result of what I have termed historical use of climate sink capacity.
Before I continue, it is important to note that those who defend accounts of
historical accountability for climate change along these lines do not always talk in
terms of debt. Theorists advocating what is known as the ‘beneficiary pays
principle’ (BPP) also commonly assign climate costs to individuals and collectives
that are appropriately related to historical polluters (again understood as those who
historically used more than a ‘fair share’ of the Earth’s assimilative capacity for
4 Though Neumayer also uses the term ‘Historical Emission Debt’ (Neumayer 2000, p. 186), we define
this concept in different ways.
5 Accounts of emission debt may also—or instead—take the creditors to be individuals or collectives
who cannot consume a fair share of the climate sink themselves due to the excessive use of historical
polluters. Although I do not discuss this view in what follows, the problem that I raise for HED—namely,
the difficulty in identifying a fair shares principle for historical consumption of the climate sink—also
presents a challenge for this alternative construal of climate creditors.
6 As Matthews puts it, ‘Fossil fuel carbon debts are easy to calculate… and could also potentially be
monetized using estimates of the economic cost of climate damages from CO2 emissions’ (Matthews
2015, p. 4).
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GHGs); where the relevant relation is taken to be the receipt of benefits derived
from those excess emissions (Bell 2010, pp. 437–438; Page 2011, pp. 421–422). I
will present some challenges for HED—and, therefore, the related formulation of
the BPP—before offering an alternative account of the injustice that characterised
historical use of the climate sink.
Challenging HED (I): Fair Shares and the Climate Sink
Part of the appeal of backward-looking theories of accountability for climate change
resides in their ability to make sense of a ‘common normative belief… that bearing
an appropriate share of the global climate response burden is a matter of
rectificatory justice, of ‘making amends’, rather than behaving beneficently to
disadvantaged states or seeking to realize a preferred global pattern of resource
distribution’ (Page 2012, p. 307). Historical accountability can be difficult to
motivate, however, because it seems that duties to bear the costs of climate change
can only be given a rectificatory rationale when they are ‘based on the wrongfulness
of what was done’ (Meyer 2013, pp. 609–610)7; and it is hard to identify any
general element of wrongdoing in historical emissions. The problem here, as David
Miller says, is that climate change does not appear to be like normal instances of
historical injustice—slavery, for example—‘where there was a clear historic wrong
that required, and may still require, redress’ (Miller 2008, p. 136). The very thing
that makes climate sink capacity so prone to overuse—namely, the difficulty of
preventing anybody, anywhere from accessing it—has also meant that many of the
injustices plaguing natural resource use are yet to be observed in its case. Nobody
has fought wars over climate sink capacity, drawn borders around it to unjustly
exclude others, or forcibly stolen from it.
The elusive wrongful factor8 in historical use of climate sink capacity cannot
generally be located in the intentions of historical emitters since (as many have
pointed out and as I have stipulated in the case at hand) they were excusably
ignorant that their actions were contributing to climate change (see, for example,
Bell 2010, pp. 437–438; Caney 2005, p. 761). One might instead seek to pinpoint
the wrong in the harm done to the victims of climate impacts,9 but this is unlikely to
be an easy connection to make either. Historical emissions would not have subjected
anybody to harmful climate impacts at all had climate change been averted; so the
link between historical emitters and climate harms only exists due to numerous
intervening factors that took place after their actions. If a switch to sustainable
technology had happened in time, or emissions had stayed at a sufficiently low level,
or international mitigation of climate change had succeeded—historical emitters
7 Or, as Zellentin puts it, ‘rectificatory justice requires both responsibility for causing the problem at hand
in a morally significant way and wrongdoing’ (Zellentin 2015, p. 269; emphasis added).
8 Page uses this terminology in his discussion of a closely related BPP (Page 2012, p. 311).
9 See Zellentin (2015).
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could have used the same amount of climate sink capacity, but there would have
been no victims of climate impacts for them to have harmed.10
The promise of HED is that it appears to offer a way around this problem. Here—
to borrow an analogy from Axel Gosseries—we can view the Earth’s assimilative
capacity for GHGs as a bin into which our emissions are dumped (Gosseries 2005,
p. 282). Until we reach the top of the bin, no dangerous interference occurs with the
climate system and there are no victims of anthropogenic climate change. Once this
capacity is breached, however, harmful climate impacts result—and then we are
faced with the question of who is responsible for this wrong, and how the costs of
dealing with it should be allocated.11
HED makes the seemingly plausible suggestion that we should figure out what a
fair distribution of emissions within the safe amount would have been and then
count emissions in excess of this as wrongful emissions, which incur a debt to those
impacted by climate change. When historical accountability is construed this way,
the ignorance of historical polluters is supposed to become irrelevant because we
can say that they committed a wrong unknowingly and thus should be held (at least
partly) liable for the resulting costs of their excess emissions, even if they cannot be
morally blamed for them.12 This account is incomplete, however, without stating
what a fair share of climate sink capacity would have been, and here we come across
the most fundamental challenge for HED: that of defending a principle of justice
that can be applied retroactively to identify fair shares.
Some such principle is essential in order to identify the acts of overuse through
which historical emission debts are originally incurred. Here, many theorists seem
to agree that ‘the principles of historical responsibility and equal entitlements come
together naturally in calculations of ‘natural debt’’ (Grubb et al. 1992, p. 313);
claiming such debts to accrue to those who have appropriated more than an equal
per capita share of climate sink capacity.13 However, as I have argued elsewhere, an
equal per capita emissions allocation appears very difficult to defend given the
nature of the climate sink (Blomfield 2013, §5). As Fabian Schuppert also points out
(this volume), a significant portion of this natural resource is constituted by forests.
Forests, however, are unevenly distributed across the Earth’s surface and thus likely
to be subject to unequal legitimate claims.14 The defender of the equal per capita
view must explain why it is that shares of climate sink capacity should be equal in a
world where some have contributed far more than others to sink preservation (or
10 See also Miller (2008, pp. 131–133), Page (2012, p. 312).
11 This is an oversimplified model in two respects. Firstly, as Gosseries says, it implies the existence of a
‘clear threshold’ beyond which harmful impacts occur—something that may be lacking in reality
(Gosseries 2005, p. 282). Furthermore, the capacity of the Earth’s climate sink is not fixed in this way; it
can be reduced by deforestation, for example, and increased by enhanced atmospheric concentration of
GHGs (IPCC 2013, pp. 484, 502).
12 See Bell (2011, pp. 401–403), Neumayer (2000, p. 188), Shue (1994, p. 363).
13 See Athanasiou and Baer (2002, pp. 82–83), Baer (2002, p. 402), Kartha (2011, pp. 508–509),
Martinez-Alier and Naron (2004, p. 18), Matthews (2015), Neumayer (2000, p. 185), and Sinden (2010,
p. 297).
14 See Mancilla (this volume) for similar worries about whether it is appropriate to distribute rights to
natural resources across the globe when the resources in question have a limited range.
Historical Use of the Climate Sink 71
123
depletion); where access to natural resources that can be used in carbon neutral
energy production is similarly uneven (with some having fewer renewable energy
options because they live on land which is forested and thus ill-equipped for biofuel
or solar production); and where the benefits of other terrestrial resources (e.g.
income derived from the sale of precious metals and fossil fuels) have been allowed
to accrue to different groups and individuals in an extremely unequal pattern that
would only be preserved by distributing this particular resource on an equal per
capita basis.
In the face of these challenges, the HED theorist could abandon the equal per
capita principle and suggest an alternative account of what fair shares of climate
sink capacity would have been historically.15 However, my claim that the question
how to share the climate sink calls for broader consideration of differential
interaction with, access to, and use of natural resources points to a deeper problem
that threatens HED more generally; one discussed by Simon Caney. Caney argues
that the equal per capita emissions view faces ‘a general challenge’ that if, as is
generally taken to be the case, ‘distributive justice is concerned with the fair share of
a ‘‘total package’’ of goods, then we have no reason to endorse a principle that
applies solely to one particular item, such as greenhouse gas emissions’ (or,
equivalently, the assimilative capacity of the climate sink that those emissions use
up). Unless we are provided with sufficient reason to focus on the allocation of this
particular resource in isolation, not only is the equal per capita principle threatened,
but also the very idea that there is any such thing as ‘the fair distribution’ of climate
sink capacity (Caney 2012, p. 271).
This general challenge, which Caney defends from a number of anticipated
counter-objections (Caney 2012, §V–VI), poses a significant problem for HED; one
that is exacerbated by the particular features of the resource with which they are
concerned. Significantly, use-rights to the assimilative capacity of the climate sink
are not valuable in themselves, but only instrumentally: climate sink capacity is an
important means in the production of goods, such as energy and food, which can
themselves be used to promote human wellbeing. These use-rights are also a
strongly substitutable means, however, in the sense that the specific goods that they
are employed to produce can be provided in other ways (Caney 2012, §VII). How
much climate sink capacity must be used in the production of any given good is
heavily dependent on the agricultural or energy producing technology employed;
the carbon intensity of any fossil fuels being used; and the availability of natural
resources that can be used for alternative, renewable energy production (e.g.
hydropower, geothermal energy or wind power). It thus becomes even harder for
proponents of HED to justify their focus on the distribution of this particular natural
resource in isolation.
The essential problem, then, is that it does not appear to make sense to talk of the
fair distribution of climate sink capacity.16 One might find this a troubling idea in
15 This is a move made by Duus-Otterstro¨m (2014, p. 457) and Bell (2010, p. 429). Neither is very
specific about what fair shares would amount to if not equal shares (in Bell’s case, this is because he
doubts that we need to have a particularly detailed account in order to identify historical polluters).
16 There is simply ‘no such thing as a fair distribution of greenhouse gas emissions per se’ (Caney 2009,
p. 137).
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our current circumstances, where any remaining climate sink capacity must be
allocated somehow among the parties that wish to claim it; and ideally in a way that
promotes global justice. However, as a forward-looking distribution problem there
are ways to address this challenge: namely, by designing a fair political process ‘in
which the relevant parties decide what particular combination of natural resources
will be employed in order to realize people’s entitlements’ (Caney 2012, p. 298),
taking broader concerns of global justice into account. But the problem remains that
with no such process having taken place in the past, the question what a fair share of
climate sink capacity would have been seems to have no determinate answer.
Challenging HED (II): Fair Shares of the Benefits
Without a principle specifying just limits on past use of climate sink capacity there
are resulting difficulties in determining who—currently—should be held account-
able for historical use of this natural resource. It is sometimes claimed that current
members of developed states inherit the historical emission debts of their
predecessors because they are in receipt of benefits derived from these past, excess
emissions (see Duus-Otterstro¨m 2014, pp. 458–461; Neumayer 2000, pp. 186, 189).
As Hayward argues in his account of ecological debt, it seems reasonable that when
one inherits an asset one must also assume any liabilities that are attached to it,
because otherwise the legitimate interests of creditors would be harmed (Hayward
2008, p. 15). The challenge just identified obviously create difficulties for this view,
however; because if one cannot show that unfair shares of climate sink capacity
were used in the creation of any particular benefits deriving from historical
emissions, then it is unclear why we should think that there are debts attached to
these assets—or that such debts are inherited along with them.
By shifting our focus to the benefits of historical emissions we may, however,
find another means by which to formulate HED. In the absence of a principle
identifying fair shares of climate sink capacity itself, that is, we might instead
consider what would constitute a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens created
by historical use of climate sink capacity. One might then argue that those who have
benefitted from such use owe a debt to those who are now burdened by the climate
change to which it has causally contributed.
One must also be careful here, however, because it does not appear that those in
receipt of benefits derived from historical use of climate sinks should necessarily be
held accountable for climate change. Presumably the enjoyment of some of these
benefits is justified—benefits necessary to the satisfaction of basic needs, for
example. This beneficiary pays approach also appears to have some troubling
implications. Imagine two societies, one of which (G) developed through the use of
geothermal energy, whilst the other (F) only had access to carbon-based energy
sources. Furthermore, imagine that although F’s wealth places it safely over any
sufficiency threshold identified by one’s preferred theory of global justice—and that
it could contribute to the costs of climate impacts without being pushed under this
threshold—it is significantly poorer than G. Perhaps G grew rich through its
abundant access to geothermal energy and other valuable natural resources (perhaps,
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even, fossil fuels that it sold for profit because it did not have much need for them
itself); whilst F only possessed very inefficient technology that created high
emissions in the production of its lesser benefits.
It is not clear how it can be fair to insist that the current members of F owe a
greater debt to those burdened by climate change—particularly if we assume that
their benefits were, otherwise, innocently acquired. To say as much appears to
impose greater burdens on current members of F purely due to the bad luck of being
descended from a previous generation which only had access to a form of energy
production that, unbeknownst to them, contributed to a problem that all countries
are now exposed to—but which G is much better placed to deal with than F (due to
its higher income and superior access to renewable energy sources).
Note that this worry is somewhat different to one raised by Caney, who points out
that the closely related polluter pays principle (PPP)—according to which those who
emit more than a fair share of GHG emissions should be held accountable for the
costs of climate change—may impose burdens on the impoverished. As Caney
points out, this worry could be obviated by combining the PPP with a rule that the
poor should not have to pay (Caney 2005, p. 763). But in my imagined case, the
worry is not that F is impoverished—I have stipulated that it is not. The concern is
rather that present members of F have already inherited fewer economic benefits
from historical use of the Earth’s natural resources; that they are merely unlucky
that the natural resources their predecessors could use in order to create those
benefits turn out to have contributed causally to negative climate impacts; and that
F’s receipt of these benefits therefore does not appear to be the right kind of feature
on which to base special rectificatory duties.
The idea behind the beneficiary pays approach would appear to be that the
benefits and burdens of historical climate sink use should be distributed in a
compensatory manner purely because they ‘share common origins’ (Page 2012,
p. 313); but this proposal instantiates an strangely resource-specific breed of
egalitarianism.17 There is no obvious reason to think that benefits and burdens
derived from the climate sink in particular should be distributed in a specific way,
independently of the global distribution of other goods. As outlined above, many of
the benefits that can be derived from the use of climate sink capacity (agricultural
products and energy) can be provided by other means, using alternative natural
resources and technologies, and less or no GHG assimilative capacity. It thus
appears particularly strange to bracket off the benefits of climate sink use and place
them in a different sphere of distribution to equivalent benefits that have simply
been produced in other ways.
17 This terminology is adapted from Gosseries who, in his own discussion of historical emissions,
describes ‘an action-specific redistributive approach’ as one having a logic ‘akin to the rejection of
arbitrariness present in egalitarian theories’, but with its scope restricted to deal only ‘with benefits and
harms that are causally related’ (Gosseries 2004, p. 50). Bell argues that this approach should be rejected
because ‘we should not focus on the distribution of the benefits and burdens resulting from particular
actions (or sets of actions)’, but should instead ‘focus on the overall distribution of benefits and burdens’
(Bell 2010, p. 437). I claim that we should reject the resource-specific beneficiary pays interpretation of
HED for the same reason—because we should focus on the overall distribution of the benefits and
burdens derived from use of the Earth’s resources.
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Even those who hold that the totality of natural resources should be distributed in
an egalitarian manner will think it justifiable for some individuals and collectives to
be in receipt of a greater share of the benefits of historical use of climate sinks if
they possess fewer benefits from other natural resources (see Blomfield 2013,
p. 299). Similarly, those burdened by climate impacts could be compensated with
benefits derived from natural resources other than the climate sink (for example,
they could be compensated using income drawn from the sale of fossil fuels or
precious minerals). Problematically for HED, then, we still seem to lack sufficient
justification for adopting a fair shares principle applied to historical use of climate
sink capacity, or the benefits derived from such use, considered in isolation.18
In order to engage in a normative assessment of historical use of climate sink
capacity, it thus appears that we must refer to a broader theory of global justice. In
light of this conclusion, the following section will discuss how we might draw on
some such theory to explain what exactly was unjust about historical use of the
climate sink.
Injustice and Historical Use of the Climate Sink
As Thomas Nagel famously says, that ‘we do not live in a just world… may be the
least controversial claim one could make in political theory’ (Nagel 2005, p. 113).
Though it is much disputed what exactly the demands of justice are at the global
level—with theorists debating, for example, whether they are egalitarian or
sufficientarian in nature—it is clear that these demands are a long way from being
met. I do not want to defend (or assume) a particular understanding of what global
justice requires in what follows, so will instead aim to appeal to acts and states of
affairs the injustice of which is relatively uncontroversial (in that they could be
deemed unjust on the basis of a number of theories of global justice). It is hard, for
example, to see what could justify the severity of the relative disadvantage to which
many individuals worldwide are subjected by global inequalities of wealth and
power. It is even more difficult to imagine a justification for the fact that in our
current global circumstances, many individuals worldwide are unable to satisfy their
most basic needs for adequate food and water, shelter, a safe environment, basic
healthcare or access to education.
Against this background, it is possible to see much historical use of the climate
sink as either deriving from or contributing to global injustice. For example, though
nobody has been physically prevented from accessing climate sink capacity itself,
its unequal consumption is to a significant extent a result of injustice concerning
other natural resources: namely, fossil fuels. Access to these latter resources, which
are the major instruments via which appropriation of climate sink capacity takes
place, has been determined by luck at best (and thus may be deemed unjust by
certain global egalitarians). At worst, it has been established by war and oppression,
18 Schuppert (this volume) mounts a similar objection to views that take an excessively narrow focus
when addressing the ethics of climate sink conservation, arguing that such questions must be situated
within a wider analysis of the requirements of climate justice.
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and should therefore be deemed unjust even by those who advocate national
ownership of natural resources.
A number of contributors to this volume note the importance of powers of
collective self-determination and their link to natural resource rights (see Banai,
Schuppert). Legitimate claims to self-determination appear to be one of the major
justifications for assigning natural resource rights in any given way; whether to
collectives with a claim to exercise self-determination on the territory containing the
natural resources in question, or to those outside the territory who require some
access to those resources in order to exercise their own self-determination. If this is
the case, then entitlements to natural resources should be allocated in a way that
supports legitimate powers of self-determination; a principle clearly violated by
repeated ‘might makes right’ acquisitions of and appropriations from fossil fuel
reserves. Control over oil, for example, has often fallen to colonial authorities,
victors in unjust war, or authoritarian regimes propped up by the international
resource privilege19; who violently compromise or devastate the self-determination
of local peoples and ignore the legitimate claims of resource-poor outsiders. A
significantly unjust allocation of fossil fuels and their benefits therefore underlies
historical use of climate sink capacity.
There may, in addition, be reason to believe that the uneven uptake of
industrialisation that made the GHG emissions of different countries so disparate
resulted from historical injustice. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James
Robinson argue that the failure of many countries to take advantage of the industrial
revolution was the result of colonial legacies of injustice: in particular, the
persistence of state institutions controlled by autocratic elites, who had reason to
fear that industrialisation could undermine their position of power (Acemoglu et al.
2002, p. 1273; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 250–273). Whether or not
unequal historical consumption of climate sink capacity is unjust in itself, then: this
inequality appears to have been borne of injustice.
As far as the contribution that historical emissions have made to global injustice
is concerned: according to a 2005 report by the World Resources Institute, the US
and the group of 25 countries that then composed the EU were responsible for an
estimated 55.8 % of cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement
manufacture between 1850 and 2002; by which point they together possessed
43.5 % of world GDP, despite accounting for only 12 % of the world population
(Baumert et al. 2005, pp. 110, 113). We do not need to invoke any fair shares
principle for climate sink capacity (or the benefits of its use) in particular in order to
state that the economic wealth of these industrialised nations—wealth that is
‘inextricably tied’ to the historical use of climate sinks (Singer 2010, p. 189)—could
have been (and should be) shared more widely. Such redistribution could have
significantly reduced the number of individuals worldwide that are unable to satisfy
their basic needs. It would also have mitigated the severe global inequality that use
of the climate sink instead appears to have enhanced. In our current situation, many
countries with relatively high historical emissions also possess significant
19 This privilege has received a fair amount of attention in the philosophical literature. See Pogge (2002,
112–114, 162–166), Wenar (2008).
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advantages of economic wealth, military might, and political influence. By
increasing the income and furthering the development of these states (thereby
enhancing global inequalities of power) historical use of the climate sink appears to
have contributed to the creation of the particular unjust circumstances in which we
now find ourselves; circumstances in which many collectives and their members are
subject to domination by powerful external agents.20
It is important to note that these worries about past use of the climate sink cannot
be defused by arguing that historical emissions have, in some sense, made
everybody better off. Some argue that claims of historical accountability for climate
change are undermined insofar as there is reason to think that the industrial
revolution also benefitted countries that did not industrialise, or that industrialised
later.21 Mathias Risse, for example, argues that ‘the benefits of industrialization
spread across the world’ in the form of trade, inventions, and scientific
understanding; the development of which ‘was possible only in industrialized
societies’. Other benefits of ‘global reach’ that Risse claims cannot be ‘detached
from industrialization’ include improvements to ‘longevity, child mortality, and
literacy’.22 Furthermore, one might point out, countries that are currently
developing have access to superior energy producing technology, invented in
earlier periods of industrialisation (Risse 2012, pp. 198–199); technology that
should allow ‘more value to be extracted from a given level of emissions’ (Grubb
1995, p. 486, fn.46).23
However, even if the benefits of the industrial revolution have been globally
dispersed in this way, historical use of the climate sink still appears to have failed to
live up to some minimal demands of justice. Firstly, it has not benefitted some
individuals enough; given that the income extracted from this global resource could
undoubtedly have been (and still could be) used to better promote the universal
satisfaction of basic needs. Secondly—and admittedly more controversially—it
appears to have benefitted some individuals, corporations and collectives too much;
by enhancing global socioeconomic inequalities that engender problematic power
relations at the global level.24
Thus, even if improvements brought about since the industrial revolution—in
technology, food production, medicine and communication—‘have originated
mostly in those countries that have imposed the global order’ (Risse 2005b, p. 370);
20 Though I have focused on states, the wealth and influence of fossil fuel corporations is similarly an
important concern.
21 See the argument to this effect in Grubb et al. (1992, pp. 316–317); and the discussion in Shue (1999,
pp. 534–535).
22 Bovens (2011, pp. 132–133) also suggests that the industrial revolution initially appeared to result in ‘a
sharp drop in poverty indicators’ in Africa and Asia as well as the West.
23 As Grubb (1995, p. 486, fn.46; emphasis added) points out, this means that equal per capita emission
rights will not amount to ‘equal benefits over time’.
24 By locating a problem with historical use of climate sink capacity in its contribution to global
inequalities—rather than the fact that some but not others are benefitting from historical GHG
emissions—we also avoid a problem faced by the BPP; namely, how to assign historical accountability if
it turns out that nobody has benefitted from historical emissions overall, as a consequence of the resulting
of climate impacts (see Caney 2006, p. 476; Page 2008, p. 563).
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the fact that this global order was imposed by those at the top end of global
inequalities of power and wealth remains troubling. As Risse says, ‘developed
countries became rich because they industrialized’ (Risse 2005a, p. 14; emphasis
added). Insofar as historical use of the climate sink has helped industrialised
countries obtain a problematic position of dominance at the global level, such use
may be considered to have contributed to injustice.25
As a global environmental resource of significant value to all human beings, one
might think that the climate sink should ideally have been placed under some form
of global jurisdiction as soon as its capacity became subject to significant use—
jurisdiction that could have determined, via a fair political process, how this
resource would be used and shared. Throughout most of history, of course, climate
sink capacity was not recognised as an exhaustible natural resource on which all
human beings depend, and the global institutions necessary to govern it collectively
were not available. But though this presents a significant challenge for those who
wish to assign debts to currently advantaged beneficiaries of historical emissions
that exceeded some ‘fair share’ of climate sink capacity; this does not prevent us
from objecting to the fact that some parties are presently benefitting from a position
of unjust advantage in an unfair global distribution of wealth and power, to which
use of the climate sink has contributed.
Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a significant challenge for the historical emission debt
view; namely, that of formulating and justifying the adoption of a fair shares
principle applied to historical use of climate sink capacity, or the benefits derived
from such use, considered in isolation. One might worry that my argument
undermines our ability to make sense of, and justify, the common intuition that
many present day duties to bear the costs of climate change (in particular, those of
the advantaged) are rectificatory in nature. However, I have also gestured in the
direction of an alternative explanation of this intuition by suggesting that historical
use of climate sink capacity can instead be deemed problematic in the sense that it is
the result of, and a significant contributor to the perpetuation of, a global order
characterised by severe injustice.26 Thus, whether or not historical consumption of
climate sink capacity can be deemed wrongfully excessive and thus in need of
rectification; there are many other injustices surrounding the use of this resource that
plausibly do call for rectification in the present.
Climate change would be a very different problem in a world less afflicted by
historical, enduring and contemporary injustice. Many of these injustices are more
25 One might claim that current global economic inequalities have been enhanced not only by past use of
the climate sink in the form of GHG emissions, but also in the form of deforestation. As Narain argues,
‘conventionally, the only way regions can develop is by cutting forests and building all that is known as
infrastructure and signifies economic growth. This is what all of us living in non-forested zones have
done. We have cut forests, then cultivated land and built factories and cities. We are rich because we have
cleared the forests’ (Narain 2011; emphasis added).
26 For some further efforts in this direction, see Blomfield (2015).
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difficult to quantify and monetize than those which the historical emission debt view
purports to identify, but this in no way undermines the importance of attempting to
understand and rectify such wrongs. Providing climate assistance to those who have
been disadvantaged by historical injustice (and rendered more vulnerable to climate
change as a result) would be one way in which the perpetrators and beneficiaries of
such injustices could try to start making amends.
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